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FLORIDA HOMESTEAD: A RESTRAINT ON
ALIENATION BY JUDICIAL ACCRETION*
HERBERT BUCHWALD**
INTRODUCTION
The sanctity of the family and home has remained inviolate since
biblical times; it is not surprising, therefore, that society has permeated
its laws with special provisions regarding the family homestead.' The
fundamental principle of "homestead law" is founded on the exemption
of homestead property from forced sale to conserve the home,2 protect
the family from want,8 and shelter them by providing a refuge from the
stresses and strains of misfortune.
4
The first homestead provision in the United States was enacted in
1839,' when the Texas legislature attempted to secure to each family a
home and means of livelihood, irrespective of possible financial misfortune
and beyond the reach of creditors. It is this need for security from the
burden of pauperism and threat of destitution which has been the founda-
tion of homestead exemption laws,' and the principle underlying appli-
cation of homestead provisions. Chief Justice Whitfield, a noted jurist in
the field of homestead law, sagaciously noted: "Organic and statutory
provisions relating to homestead exemptions should be liberally construed
in the interest of the family home."7
With a view to realizing the basic objectives of homestead laws,
in Florida, the constitution and statutes have placed certain express re-
strictions upon the alienation of homestead property, both by testa-
mentary disposition and inter vivos deed. However, the nature, extent and
* This article was awarded first prize in competition with entries from all Florida
law schools in the 1964 Lawyers Title Guaranty Fund contest for student papers in the
field of real property law.
** Member of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. There are homestead exemptions throughout the United States with the exception
only of Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.
Haskins, Homestead Exemption, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1950). In addition, the following
countries have adopted American type homestead exemption provisions with various limita-
tions on the value exempt: Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Switzerland, France, Germany.
7 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 441, 443-44 (1942).
2. WAPLES, HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTIONS 3 (1893).
3. Beall v. Pinckney, 150 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1945).
4. Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 377 So.2d 443 (1942).
5. Laws of the Republic of Texas, Act of January 26, 1839, 3d Cong., 1st Sess., 113.
6. West Fla. Grocery Co. v. Tutonia Fire Ins. Co., 74 Fla. 220, 77 So. 209 (1917).
7. Milton v. Milton, 63 Fla. 533, 536, 58 So. 718, 719 (1912); Chief Justice Randall
had earlier observed:
[F]ew men would mortgage their household goods and their children's clothes to
a hard creditor ... but many thoughtless and improvident people might be induced
to obtain credit by merely waiving the benefit of exemption and thus placing the
last blanket and bed and their own and the children's clothing at the mercy of a
hard creditor. Carters Adm'r v. Carter, 20 Fla. 558, 570 (1884).
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effect of these limitations have become blurred by conflicting elements of
public policy and doubtful interpretations of the organic law.' It is the
purpose of this article to examine a particularly distressing restraint on
alienation-one that has emerged through judicial "accretions" over the
past seventy-five years-involving the voluntary inter vivos conveyance of
homestead property by the head of a family to the spouse in fee simple,
or in an attempt to create a tenancy by the entireties. The practice of
making inter vivos conveyances of the homestead is far from infrequent,
thus rendering the problem all the more acute. In addition, the application
of the judicially-created principles has posed an enigma that would per-
plex the most versatile tribunal, no less the common advocate. By de-
liberating the issues in this article, the reader, it is hoped, will gain a
clearer understanding of the judicial trend.9
ALIENATION IN GENERAL
The numerous controversies that have arisen over conveyances of
homestead are understandable. Homestead provisions, which have been
adopted for the protection of the heirs of homesteaders, may not apply to
property held by the entireties. Property held by the entireties can be dis-
posed of as any other property not exclusively owned by a head of the
family and occupied as a homestead."0 On the other hand, homestead
property is a special kind of species of property."
The right of an owner to alienate his property is not conferred by
constitutional or by legislative grace. It is an inherent right, being an in-
cident to, or attribute of, the ownership of property. 2 In the absence of
restricting statutes, the family head has as full and perfect a right to con-
vey the homestead preperty as if it had not been a homestead." Since
the power of alienation is an incident of the ownership of property, in-
dependent of the homestead law, the directions and prohibitions of the
statutes are mere restrictions upon this antecedent power.'4
8. Crosby & Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption, 2 U.
FLA. L. REv. 12 (1949).
9. Although the scope of this article does not permit, it is important to recognize the
problem of determining how much area of the property is exempt under the homestead
provisions and exemption of the improvements thereon. See generally Cowdery v. Herring,
106 Fla. 567, 143 So. 433 (1932); Anderson Mill & Lumber Co. v. Clements, 101 Fla. 523,
134 So. 588 (1931).
10. Denham v. Sexton, 48 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1950).
11. Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962).
12. Thomas v. Craft, 55 Fla. 842, 46 So. 594 (1908).
13. Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 22 So. 687 (1897).
14. Ibid.; 40 C.J.S. Homesteads § 123 (1944); Brannon v. Brannon, 269 Ky. 394, 96
S.W.2d 1036 (1936); accordingly, where there is neither constitutional nor statutory
prohibition or where there has been a compliance with applicable restrictions, the owner
of a homestead may, as an incident to the right of ownership, sell or encumber it, and the
sale or transfer, when evidenced by a proper conveyance, will be as valid as though the
property had not been set apart as a homestead. Coakley v. Swim, 218 Cal. 340, 23 P.2d
518 (1933) ; Farley v. Harvey, 93 Colo. 105, 25 P.2d 185 (1933) ; Lyle v. Roswell Store, 187
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ALIENATION BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
At common law, a conveyance from a husband to his wife was an im-
possibility since it constituted an admission that the wife had an inde-
pendent existence. For the same reason, a wife could not convey to her
husband.' 5 Only by means of a conveyance by both spouses to a third
party and then by the third party back to one of them could a transfer
be effected from one to the other. 6 Today, statutes authorize conveyances
directly from one spouse to the other, 7 and some states even dispense
with the requirement that the grantee spouse join in the conveyance.' 8
Similarly, at common law, the requirement that the traditional
"unities" be present prevented an owner of land from creating an estate
by the entireties by executing a deed to himself and his spouse. Although
such a procedure would be a straightforward and logical method of
creating such a tenancy, the effectiveness of such conveyances has been
repeatedly challenged. 9 The attacks have been founded on the proposition
that every conveyance requires a grantor and grantee by which the
grantor divests himself of title and the grantee thereby becomes vested.
Therefore, it is argued, one cannot convey to himself that which he al-
ready owns." The creation of a tenancy by the entireties requires for its
creation the four unities of time, title, interest and possession.2' Conse-
quently, the conveyance must fail at common law when the grantees do
not have one and the same interest, accruing by one and the same convey-
ance, commencing at one and the same time, and held by one and the
same undivided possession. Conveyances have been held ineffective even
where the intention of the parties was clear and expressed unmistakably.22
The quest for a means of circumventing the unity theory gave rise to the
practice of conveying property to a third person or trustee, who, acting
as a straw man, immediately conveyed the property back to the husband
Ga. 386, 200 S.E. 702 (1938); Brannon v. Brannon, 265 Ky. 394, 96 S.W.2d 1036 (1936);
United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Stevens, 93 Mont. 11, 17 P.2d 62 (1932); Birks v.
Globe Int'l Protective Bureau, 56 N.D. 613, 218 N.W. 864 (1928); Oklahoma State Bank v.
Van Hassell, 189 Okla. 48, 114 P.2d 912 (1941) ; Stewart v. Black, 143 Ore. 291, 22 P.2d 337
(1933) ; Grissom v. Anderson, 125 Tex. 26, 79 S.W.2d 619 (1935) ; Delfelder v. Teton
Land & Inv. Co., 46 Wyo. 142, 24 P.2d 702 (1933).
15. A deed from the wife to anyone required her husband's joinder. If the husband
joined in the wife's conveyance to himself it was said to be void since he could not
convey to himself. See POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 622 (1964).
16. 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW § 182 (1935).
17. FLA. STAT. § 689.11(l) (1963) is representative of the jurisdictions in providing:
A conveyance of real estate, made by a husband direct to his wife, or by a wife
direct to her husband, shall be effectual to convey the legal title to such wife,
or husband, as the case may be, in all cases in which it would be effectual if the
parties were not married. ...
18. FLA. STAT. § 689.11(1) (1963), which states that "the grantee need not join in the
execution of such conveyances," is typical.
19. PATTON, LAND TITLE § 394 (1938).
20. Ibid.
21. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 615 (1964).
22. BAYSE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 278 (1953).
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and wife as tenants by the entireties."8 Modern legislation authorizing
husbands and wives to contract directly with one another undoubtedly is
sufficient to obviate the necessity of conveyancing through a third party
in order to produce the desired results.24 However, the refusal of some
courts to adopt this view on their own has provoked legislation expressly
authorizing conveyances by one party to himself and another, as joint
tenants or as tenants by the entireties.25 This makes possible a direct
conveyance to create either kind of estate by a single instrument. In
Florida 26 and many other jurisdictions2 7 the unity theory argument may
be readily discarded since its impact on the validity of a conveyance is
no longer felt.
23. WiLLiAmS & EASTWOOD, REAL PROPERTY, 445 (1933).
24. The English Conveyancy Act of 1881 permitted land to be conveyed by one person
to himself and another as joint tenants without the inclusion of the "use expression." 44 &
45 Vict. c. 41, § 50 (1881), now replaced by Law of Property Act 1925, 15 Geo. V, c. 20,
§ 72 (2).
25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 683 (1963) (Conveyances to self and another or to self and wife
in joint tenancy); CoLo. REV. STAT. 118-2-1 (1953) (Conveyances to self and another
or from two or more grantors to themselves in joint tenancy) ; FLA. STAT. § 689.11 (1963);
ME. REV. STAT. ch. 168, § 13 (1954) (Conveyances to self and another in joint tenancy);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 10-15 (1957) (Model Interparty Agreement) (Conveyances to
self and another in joint tenancy or otherwise); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 8
(1958) (Conveyances to self and spouse as tenants by entirety or to self and another in
joint tenancy); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 565.49 (1955) (Conveyances to self and another as
joint tenants or to self and wife as tenants by entirety); Miss. CODE § 834 (1942) (Con-
veyances to self and another as joint tenants or to self and spouse as tenants by entirety) ;
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 440.025 (1963) (Conveyances to self and another or to self and spouse
in joint tenancy or as tenants by entirety, in common or in partnership, with same effect
as if made from a stranger to grantee); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-642 (1943) (Conveyances
to self and another in joint tenancy); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 102.010-.060 (Model Interparty
Act) and § 111.065 (1963) (Conveyances to self and another in joint tenancy or other-
wise); N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS § 240-B (1963) (Conveyances to self and another in joint
tenancy or to self and spouse as tenants by entirety); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-13.3 (1957)
(Conveyances from one spouse to another); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-1023 (1943) (Convey-
ances to self and another or to self and spouse in joint tenancy) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 108.090
(1964) (Conveyances to spouse indicating an intention to create estate by entirety); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 551, tit. 48 § 71, tit. 69 § 541 (1955) (Model Interparty Agreement
Act) (Conveyances to self and another in joint tenancy or to self and wife if tenants by
entirety); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-3 (1956) (Conveyances to self and another or to self
and spouse as cotenants under any tenancy allowable by law) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-110
(1964) (Conveyances between spouses of interest in property held as tenants by entirety);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-5 (1953) (Conveyances to self and another in joint tenancy);
VA. CODE § 55-9 (1950) (Conveyances to self and another in joint tenancy or otherwise);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 230.45 (1958) (Conveyances to self and another or to self and spouse
in joint tenancy).
26. Croker v. Croker, 9 F.2d 409 (S.D. Fla. 1925); see also, FLA. STAT. § 689.11(1)
(1963), which now expressly provides:
An estate by the entirety may be created by the spouse holding fee simple title
conveying to the other by a deed in which the purpose to create such estate is
stated.
27. It is now well settled that a conveyance by a husband to his wife without the
intervention of a third person or trustee, where suitable and meritorious and not in fraud
of creditors, will be upheld in equity. Thomas v. Hornbrook, 259 Ill. 156, 102 N.E. 198
(1913); Hunt v. Johnson, 44 N.Y. 27 (1870). In those states where the legal identity of
husband and wife is no longer recognized, or where specific statute permits, such conveyances
may be good at law. FITCH, ABSTRACTS AND TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY § 242 (1954).
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CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Homestead property was unknown at common law. In Florida, the
concept of homestead is a creature of the constitution.28 The constitution
places only one express limitation on alienation of homestead property
while the owner is alive, namely, that whenever he or she has a living
spouse, the joint consent and due execution by both is required.29 It
specifically contemplates the alienation of the homestead by husband and
wife by providing in Article X:
Sec. 4. Nothing in this Article shall be construed to prevent the
holder of a homestead from alienating his or her homestead so
exempted by deed or mortgage duly executed by himself or her-
self, and by husband and wife, if such relation exists; nor if the
holder be without children to prevent him or her from dis-
posing of his or her homestead by will in a manner prescribed
by law.8 0
Voluntary transfers of homestead property are not prohibited by the
constitution or legislature. The constitution merely attempts to protect
the family by requiring the spouse of the homesteader to join in any con-
veyance alienating the homestead.8
1
The Florida Constitution, in article X, section 1, also provides that
"a homestead shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any
court." Whenever the realty in question is held by its owners under such
circumstances as to make it exempt from forced sale, it is also subject to
the restrictions on alienation laid down by the Florida Constitution and
statutes.
82
It would appear that the framers of the constitution clearly mani-
fested the extent to which they intended to restrain the alienation of
homestead property. However, doubt has arisen due to its inclusion of
section 2, which provides:
Sec. 2. The exemptions provided for in section one shall inure
to the widow and heirs of the party entitled to such exemption,
and shall apply to all debts, except as specified in said section.
28. FLA. CONST. art. X.
29. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 1 provides:
A homestead . . . shall not be alienable without the joint consent of husband and
wife, when that relation exists.
30. There are no constitutional restrictions on bequests of homestead personalty. The
true principle of law is that once homestead realty is duly alienated during the life of its
owner, any proceeds other than real property received in exchange are governed by the
homestead provisions relating to personalty. In Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 22 So. 687
(1897), the general principle that ownership of property by a living person comports an
inherent right to manage and transfer that property, is clearly recognized although the
decision has been, on occasion, distinguished in homestead discussions on the ground that
it deals only with personal property.
31. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
32. The authority of the legislature to deal with alienation of homestead is derived
from FLA. CONsT. art. X, § 6.
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Presumably, the constitution provided for the exemptions to inure to the
benefit of the "widow and heirs." The broad judicial interpretation given
this section has been unfortunate.
The words "alienable" and "alienating" as used in the constitution
in connection with the transfer of homesteads refer to the conveyance and
transfer of legal title or any beneficial interest in the exempt homestead
real estate during the life of the owner.88 In any event, the deed or mort-
gage purporting to alienate the homestead must be "duly executed." 4 If
the requirements of the constitution and statutes are not complied with in
"alienating" homestead real estate, the attempt is a nullity as to the
"heirs" of the homesteader and also as to the husband and wife. 5 In
order to be "duly executed," -the instrument must be signed in the pres-
ence of two subscribing witnesses, attested as to each signature,86 and,
as to relinquishment of a wife's dower, a statutory "acknowledgment"
is part of the due execution of a deed or mortgage.
37
The constitutional exemptions apply only to property owned by the
head of the family.88 The methods prescribed for the alienation of the
exempted real estate are restrictions designed for the protection of the
beneficiaries of the exemption. However, the courts have held that these
methods are as essential when the homestead real estate is alienated to
members of the family as it is to others.89 Since the method by which
the homestead shall be alienated are expressly and specifically described
in the constitution, all other methods of alienation are inhibited.4°
The importance of observing the formalities in the execution of in-
struments alienating the homestead was painfully illustrated in 1920
when a mortgagee attempted to foreclose a mortgage lien upon home-
stead real estate. The wife admitted the signature was authentic, but
denied that she had ever acknowledged it. The court, in holding the mort-
gage unenforceable, stated it was void for failure to have been "duly
executed.'41 The occurrence is not uncommon. The court has found con-
veyances of homestead invalid for failure of the wife to join in the execu-
tion of a deed when she was the grantee. 2
In most jurisdictions, as in Florida, the provisons creating the right
of homestead effects a restriction on alienation of the property. Generally,
the instrument of conveyance or encumbrance must represent the joint
33. Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fa. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920).
34. Ibid.; Byrd v. Byrd, 73 Fla. 322, 74 So. 313 (1917).
35. Hutchinson v. Stone, supra note 33.
36. FLA. STAT. § 689.01 (1963).
37. FLA. STAT. § 693.03 (1963).
38. Thomas v. Craft, 55 Fla. 842, 46 So. 594 (1908).
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920).
42. Byrd v. Byrd, 73 Fla. 322, 74 So. 313 (1917).
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act of husband and wife, if that relation exists.4 Provisions restraining
alienation of the homestead without obtaining the consent of the wife do
not impair the obligation of contract.44
Restraints upon alienation of the homestead do not operate to de-
stroy entirely the husband's authority respecting it.4 The husband may,
in some instances, alienate by his sole act. He may abandon it, taking
the family with him, and then sell it subject to his wife's dower interest
without her concurrence,46 for by the act of abandonment the property
ceases to be homestead.47 However, saving the power to abandon and
take the family with him, the general rule clearly is that a husband alone
can do nothing by which the homestead will be divested.48
It should be apparent that the express restraints on alienation of
homestead are not complicated. The constitution imposes a single re-
quirement upon inter vivos alienation of homestead property, the joinder
of the wife. Although the formalities are not complex, they have been
strictly construed,49 and failure to comply renders the attempted con-
veyance a nullity.50 Presumably, when the constitutional rights of the
wife and children are involved, form is given great weight over sub-
stance.
43. THOMPSON, HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTIONS (1878).
44. Ibid.; The Constitution of Nevada provides that the homestead,
shall be exempt from forced sale under any process of law, and shall not be
alienated without the joint consent of husband and wife .. .provided, the pro-
visions of this sentence shall not apply to any process of law obtained by virtue
of a lien given by the consent of both husband and wife. . . . NEv. CONST. art. 4,
§ 30.
45. It should be noted that FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 restricts the devise of a homestead
if the head of the family has children. However, FLA. Stat. § 731.05 (1963) restricts the
devise of a homestead whether there be a spouse or children. This has been held constitu-
tional. Saxon v. Rawls, 51 Fla. 555, 41 So. 594 (1906); Thomas v. Williamson, 51 Fla. 332,
40 So. 831 (1906). If the head of a family dies owning a homestead and there is a surviv-
ing spouse but no children, title will vest absolutely in the spouse under the general rule
governing the order of descent. FLA. STAT. § 731.23 (1963).
46. Agreements to convey homestead property must be signed in the presence of two
witnesses, as required by FLA. STAT. § 689.01 (1963), to be effectual. Zimmerman v.
Deitrich, 97 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1958).
47. Article XI of the Florida Constitution does not modify or effect the operation of
Article X regulating the execution of conveyances and mortgages of homestead real estate,
whether the wife or the husband is the head of the family and the owner of the homestead
real estate. Bigelow v. Dumphe, 144 Fla. 330, 198 So. 13 (1940).
48. In Wilson v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 64 So.2d 309 (Fla. 1953), the court was con-
fronted with a difficult problem of specific property constituting homestead. The dispute
arose between a widow claiming dower and a daughter claiming the property by descent.
The decedent had 40 acres, five of which were owned jointly with his wife, as tenants
by the entirety, and the other 35 acres which were owned by him individually. The house
was located on the five acre tract. The widow elected statutory dower in order to assert
a right against the 35 acres. The court found the entire 40 acre tract constituted the home-
stead of the decedent. Although the five acre tract passed to the widow as the surviving
tenant, the 35 acre tract, as homestead, descended to the daughter subject to a life estate
in the widow.
49. Hutchinson v. Stone, supra note 41.
50. Ibid.
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JUDICIAL RESTRAINTS AND IMPLIED REQUIREMENTS
The implied limitations contained in the constitution are as much
a part of the organic law and are as effective as those which are ex-
pressed. 51 However, while ownership of homestead property may be sub-
ject to the needs of society, it is questionable whether the judiciary
should tamper with the right of an individual to alienate his property
unless the necessity for the restraint is clearly indicated by constitutional
or statutory provisions or the unequivocal mandate of public policy.
Nevertheless, through a gradual evolution of decisions dealing with
homestead property the judiciary has imposed an implied restraint on
alienation, based on the presumed intention of the framers of the consti-
tution, for the protection of the homesteader's children.
The Indestructible Homestead Interest
Notwithstanding the clarity of the express provisos of the constitu-
tion, the supreme court has seen fit to conceive a virtually indestructible
homestead interest belonging to the children of the homesteader. This
judicial creation has not been abruptly precipitated through a single
erudite decision. Rather, it emerges from an impressive accretion of ju-
dicial decisions, which, taken in their entirety, effectively limit the inher-
ent rights of ownership of homestead property as distinct from other real
property. What the electorate chose not to prescribe, the bench has
supplied by a process as clever as it was gradual and at least as doubtful
as it was devious. 5 The judicial artifice has been perpetrated in the name
of protecting a somewhat illogical interest that children acquire by rea-
son of their parents' ownership of homestead property and which result is
inferred from article X, section 2 of the Florida Constitution, which pro-
vides, "the exemptions ... shall inure to the widow and heirs of the party
entitled to such exemption .... ,,53
In 1897, the supreme court in Hinson v. Booth5" was called upon to
construe article X, section 2 of the Florida Constitution. Grandchildren
had filed a claim against an estate for their share of personal prop-
51. Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931) ; Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563,
107 So. 255 (1925).
52. A severe criticism of the judicial transmutation may be found in Trible, Homestead
Law in Florida as a Restraint of Alienation, 5 FLA. L.J. 37 (1931).
53. This provision of the constitution is a revised form of the original homestead
provision contained in the Florida Constitution of 1868. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (1868)
provided:
The exemptions provided for in sections 1 and 2 of this article, shall accrue to the
heirs of the party having enjoyed or taken the benefit of such exemption, and the
exemption provided for in section 1 of this article shall apply to all debts, except
as specified in said section, no matter when or where the debt was contracted,
or liability incurred.
It is significant to note that the exemption to inure as adopted in 1885, and as still applied
today, added the "widow" to the provision which previously provided only for the "heirs."
54. 39 Fla. 333, 22 So. 687 (1897).
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erty exempt from forced sale under the constitution by reason of the
testator's position as the head of a household.55 The grandchildren con-
tended that the personal property descended to them under the Constitu-
tion, since section 2 provides that exemptions inure to the widow and
heirs of the party entitled to such exemption.5" Consequently, they con-
tended, the 1,000 dollar personal property subject to the exemption de-
scends by operation of law rather than by will. The court stressed that the
exemption is merely from forced sale arising from the debts of the home-
steader. It is only the exemption that inures to the widow and heirs by
virtue of the Constitution. Therefore, the court concluded that there
could be no reasonable construction which would grant title to either the
widow or the heirs. The posture of the court is reflected in its reference
to Godwin v. King,57 which was quoted as follows:
The construction put upon the old constitution was that the ex-
emption provided for was an exemption from sale for the debts
of the homesteader, and that this exemption was all that inured
to the heir after the death of the ancestor by virtue of the consti-
tution. The provision in this constitution that the exemption
should accrue to the heir did not cast upon him an estate in the
exempt property, but was a shield for so much of his inheritance
against the debts of his ancestor. The homestead article in the
constitution of 1885 is no more a regulation of the descent of
property than the former one of 1868.
Although the exemption inures to the widow and heirs, the respective
rights to obtain the property must be ascertained from other sources. It
was well recognized that homestead provisions do not undertake to be-
stow upon the widow or heirs an estate in the exempted property. All
that inures to the widow and heirs is the right to exempt the property
from forced sale for the debts of the deceased head of the family.
The court, in Hinson v. Booth, recognized that the "immunity from
debt" that inures to the heirs is appended only to such property as the
heirs acquire at the death of the ancestor.5" This view has been adopted
55. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
56. The word "heir" is ordinarily used to describe those persons who answer the
description at the death of the testator, and in its strict and technical import it applies to
the person or persons appointed by law to succeed to the estate in case of intestacy. Williams
v. Williams, 149 Fla. 454, 6 So.2d 275 (1942). The provisions of the FLA. CONST. art. IX,
§ 3 (1868) that the exemption of a homestead should accrue to the heirs, includes an
adult son, adult grandson, and the son of a daughter deceased at the death of the head
of a family, notwithstanding that they were not, at his death, living at the home place.
Miller v. Finegan, 26 Fla. 29, 7 So. 140 (1890).
57. 31 Fla. 525, 534, 13 So. 108, 110 (1893).
58. The Florida Probate Law Act, FLA. STAT. § 731.05 (1963), provides:
Any property, real or personal, held by any title, legal or equitable, with or without
actual seisin, may be devised, or bequeathed by will; provided, however, that when-
ever a person who is head of a family, residing in this state and having a home-
stead therein, dies and leaves either a widow or lineal descendants or both surviv-
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in virtually all jurisdictions having similar provisions."8 In Texas, chil-
dren have no interest in the homestead against a surviving parent by
virtue of the homestead rights of the deceased parent.
60
The doctrine of Hinson v. Booth is sound. Children should not con-
trol the disposition of the homestead nor assert a right adverse to the
acts of their parents. Certainly, -the parent has a right to dispose of the
homestead without consulting the children and whatever binds the head
of the family is binding upon the children. The policy of statutes limiting
alienation of the homestead is for the protection of the family in the
possession and enjoyment of the homestead. They are not intended to
interpose obstacles in the way of conveyancing-certainly not convey-
ances to the wife-whatever may be the form of such conveyance.6'
The tenets of Hinson v. Booth remained unassailed for more than
twenty years. However, early into the turn of the century, the court
exhibited a propensity for strict construction of the homestead laws by
invalidating a deed which was executed by the husband alone, even
though the wife and the husband's two adopted children were the
grantees.62 In 1914 the court still embraced the Hinson v. Booth doctrine:
The status of a homestead which the Constitution impresses
upon property ... does not change the nature of the estate...
but merely exempts such property from certain liabilities to
which it would otherwise be subject, and limits the owner's in-
herent power of alienation, by making such property "exempt
from forced sale under process of any court," and by making
the real estate "inalienable without the joint consent of the hus-
band and wife, when that relation exists."68
In 1920, commencing with Hutchinson v. Stone,6 4 the court was con-
ing him, the homestead shall not be the subject of devise, but shall descend as
otherwise provided in this law for the descent of homesteads.
FLA. STAT. § 731.27 (1963) expressly deals with the descent of the homestead:
The homestead shall descend as other property; provided, however, that if the
decedent is survived by a widow and lineal descendants, the widow shall take a
life estate in the homestead, with vested remainder to the lineal descendants in being
at the time of the death of the decedent.
59. THOMPSON, HOMESTEAD AND ExEMPTIoN LAWS (1878).
60. Johnson v. Taylor, 43 Tex. 121 (1875).
61. Accordingly, in Wisconsin, a deed of an undivided interest to the wife and children
was not held to be void, even for want of a wife's signature, since it would not constitute
"an alienation" of the homestead within the meaning of the statutes. Riehl v. Bingenheimer,
28 Wis. 84 (1871).
62. Thomas v. Craft, 55 Fla. 842, 847, 46 So. 594, 596 (1908), in which the court
remarked:
No instrument is effectual as an alienation of or a conveyance or transfer of
title or any interest in homestead real estate, without the joint consent of husband
and wife when that relation exists, which joint consent shall be evidenced by a
deed or mortgage duly executed and acknowledged by the husband and wife with
the formalities prescribed by law for conveyances by husband and wife.
See also: Byrd v. Byrd, 73 Fla. 322, 74 So. 313 (1917).
63. Johns v. Bowden, 68 Fla. 32, 44, 66 So. 155, 159 (1914).
64. 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920).
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fronted with the first in a series of cases involving the alienation of home-
stead. Although the court did not expressly recede from its prior view, a
change appeared in its attitude toward the constitutional right of the
children of the homesteader.
The Hutchinson case involved a mortgagee's attempt to foreclose a
lien upon homestead property. The wife contended that she had never
acknowledged her signature on the mortgage. The court decided the
mortgage was void since it was not "duly executed."65 It is interesting
that instead of sympathizing with the good faith mortgagee, the court
concerned itself with the "heirs" of the homestead owner and -their "inter-
est in the homestead real estate that can be alienated only as provided
in the Constitution."'6
In Hutchinson, the court germinated the seed of a judicial restraint
on the alienation of homestead property justified only by a self-imposed
duty to protect a newly recognized property "interest" in the heirs of
the homesteader. Nevertheless, the court was confronted only with apply-
ing the constitutional provisions restricting alienation67 and its decision
implied no limitations not constitutionally expressed.
Just three years later, in Norton v. Baya,68 the supreme court in-
validated a deed duly executed by a husband and joined by his wife in
an attempt to convey the homestead to the wife through a third person.
The court, in a unanimous opinion, revealed its mutable views by
commenting: 69
If given effect [the deed] would operate to transfer the legal
title to the homestead from the husband to the wife, stripped
of its homestead status or character, thereby converting her
interest therein into absolute ownership, and divest his "chil-
dren" who are his prospective "heirs," of the interest which,
under the Constitution, inures to them.
Justice Whitfield concurred specially:7"
The statutory provision that a husband may by deed convey
real estate direct to his wife, cannot affect the intent of the
organic provisions that homestead real estate may be alienated
only by a deed or mortgage jointly and duly executed by the
65. The significance of observing formalities required by statute is discussed in text
accompanying note 39 supra.
66. In the Hutchinson decision the court propounded the general principle that "if the
requirements of the constitution and statutes are not complied with in 'alienating' home-
stead real estate, the attempt is a nullity as to the 'heirs' of the homestead owner and
also as to the husband and wife." Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 164, 84 So. 151, 154
(1920).
67. I.e., the formalities of a "duly executed" instrument.
68. 88 Fla. 1, 102 So. 361 (1924).
69. Id. at 6, 102 So. at 363.
70. Id. at 11, 102 So. at 364.
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husband and wife if such relation exists, and cannot affect the
organic provision that homestead exemptions "shall inure to the
widow and heirs" of the owner. The children of the owner who
are his statutory "heirs" have a right and an interest in the
homestead real estate exemptions that are secured by the Con-
stitution, and the owner cannot transfer the property to another
except by the alienation that is expressly provided for in which
the wife must join.
In Norton v. Baya the court initiated the judicial gymnastics later
relied upon as precedent. The court failed to note any distinction between
the exemption inuring to the benefit of heirs, as opposed to the property
itself. Specifically, the court renounced the logical contention that its
position was inconsistent with the realities of acceptable voluntary con-
veyances."' Notwithstanding Justice Whitfield's eloquent dictum, the
deeds, which were not to become effective and were not recorded until
the husband's death, were found to be testamentary in nature, and there-
fore, violative of the constitutional inhibition against the devise of home-
stead property when the testator leaves surviving children.72
After Norton v. Baya, the court began seizing upon inapplicable
situations to expound its theory of restraining alienation of homestead
property. By way of its dicta, the court maintained that certain voluntary
conveyances of homestead were in derogation of -the children's rights.73
It was not, however, until 1931 that the court was confronted with an
appropriate factual situation. Interestingly, like in Hutchinson v. Stone
where the rationale originated, the good faith mortgagee was again left
holding the bag.
In Church v. Lee,74 a husband had executed a deed of homestead
71. It is suggested that the constitution should not be held to forbid a voluntary
transfer of homestead to the wife, even though the owner of the homestead has
children, since the owner of the homestead and his wife might have duly alienated
the homestead to others than the children of the owner or they might have aban-
doned the property as a homestead so that it could be disposed of as other real
estate and the children would thereby have lost their interest; or the father might
have survived his wife and his children being grown and living in their own home,
the homestead character of the property would be lost, because the owner would
then no longer be the head of the family, though he continued to occupy the prop-
erty as his home .... [T]hese or other circumstances or contingencies do not afford
authority for or justify a voluntary conveyance of a homestead to the wife. Norton
v. Baya, 88 Fla. 1, 11, 102 So. 301, 365 (1924).
72. FLA. CONST., art. X, § 4. The statutes are not in conflict with the constitution
in connection with their authority to alter the substantive rules of descent. Nesmith v.
Nesmith, 155 Fla. 823, 21 So.2d 789 (1945), Saxon v. Rawls, 51 Fla. 555, 41 So. 594
(1906). The statutory terminology dealing with restrictions on the devise of homestead is
narrower than that employed in § 2 of article X, which provides that the exemption shall
inure to the "widows and heirs" of the head of the family, and yet, is somewhat broader
than that of § 4 which uses the word "children" in imposing what has come to be regarded
by the judiciary as an inferential restriction on the devise of homestead.
73. Jordan v. Jordan, 100 Fla. 1586, 132 So. 466 (1931); Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla.
563, 107 So. 255 (1925).
74. 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931).
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property to his wife while he had living children and a daughter by
adoption. He continued to live on the property until his death, at which
time he left his wife, a son and the plaintiff in this action, his adopted
daughter. The deed, executed in 1920 and purporting to convey the home-
stead, was not recorded until after the husband's death. The widow then
executed a mortgage to encumber the property. An action to set aside the
deed and mortgage and to obtain a partition of the property was initiated
by the adopted daughter. 75 Church v. Lee became noted for its finding
that a homestead cannot lawfully be alienated by a deed jointly executed
by husband and wife to the wife. The property continues to be subject
to inheritance by the surviving children, adults as well as minors, whether
or not they were living on the homestead. Admittedly, the Constitution
and statutes do not expressly prohibit a conveyance to the wife by a deed
executed by the owner of a homestead and joined by his wife. Never-
theless, the court was firmly convinced that such a prohibition necessarily
may be implied. Adroitly flexing its judicial muscles, the court 6 pro-
nounced that:
the deed ... to the homestead real estate was prima facie void
as against the vested interests of complainant ... ; such deed,
under the Constitution and statutes of this state, was ineffective
to transfer the fee-simple title; ... such attempted "alienation"
merely left the title to the homestead substantially where it was
before, without divesting it of its character as a homestead.
Significantly, in Church v. Lee, as in Norton v. Baya,77 the deed was not
recorded until after the husband's death. However, the court refused to
take notice of the testamentary character of the conveyance. Instead it
applied its newly-founded principle to reach the same result.
Church v. Lee did not expressly overrule Hinson v. Booth,78 nor did
it attempt to reveal the nature and extent of the "vested interest" it had
conferred upon the children of the homesteader. As a consequence, the
doctrine of Church v. Lee left much to be desired as a rule of law. A deed
which is "prima facie void" imports a presumption of invalidity that may
be rebutted-a voidable deed rather than one which is void. On the other
hand, the implication of a constitutional "vesting of interest" in the heirs
would create a rule of descent rather than a rule of law.79
Church v. Lee has been severely criticized.8" Justice Terrell, vehe-
75. Ibid.
76. Id. at 488, 136 So. at 247.
77. See note 68 supra.
78. 39 Fla. 333, 22 So. 687 (1897).
79. The court was later to recede from this statement by pronouncing the interest
to be "inchoate." Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962).
80. Denham v. Sexton, 48 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1950); Scoville v. Scoville, 40 So.2d 840
(Fla. 1949); Florida Nat'l Bank v. Winn, 158 Fla. 750, 30 So.2d 298 (1947).
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mently dissenting in Florida Nat'l Bank v. Winn,8 recognized that home-
stead provisions were designed for the benefit of the family, to preserve
its finest traditions. There is nothing in the constitution to warrant the
suggestion that a child may thwart the desire of a parent in the matter of
disposing of the homestead by deed. Justice Terrell cleverly noted:' 2
The makers of the constitution did not know much about formal
ethics but they knew their own mind and ruled their own house-
hold. It is contrary to all human experience to contend that they
wrote anything in the constitution that would warrant one in
thinking that a child long departed from the family tree might
return and thwart a transaction made like t1his in good faith.
They were not a breed that subscribed to junior rule. The more
persistent one pursues such a theory the deeper it penetrates
the fog of obscurity.
Shortly after the Winn case, in Scoville v. Scoville, ' a deed was executed
several hours before the wedding ceremony. The court in dictum utilized
the opportunity to recede tentatively from its Cjurch v. Lee doctrine
when it stated:
These sections [Fla. Const. art. X, § 1, § 2 and § 4] place but
one limitation on the alienation of the homestead property by
deed while its owner is alive, namely, that iif the homestead
owner has a spouse, the joint consent of both and due execution
of the deed by both, are absolutely necessary. The fact that the
homesteader may have children or other dependents in being at
the time of the execution of the deed is wholly immaterial in this
connection.... Aside from these limitations, a deed which has
as its object the conveyance of homestead property to a grantee
other than the living spouse should be treated i, any other inter
vivos transfer of real property ....
Although later cited in numerous decisions, Scovil~e never developed to
overthrow the Church v. Lee doctrine. Today, -this view, following the
dissent in Winn, is relegated to the minority.
A futile but ingenious application of the Church v. Lee doctrine
recently confronted a federal court.8 5 The defendant resisted a federal
income tax lien against homestead property by contending -that the chil-
dren's vested property interest was not subject to levy for the satisfaction
of the head of the family's tax liability. It was argued that the property
interest of the widow and children could not be atlached for obligations
they did not incur and for which they were not liable; only the husband's
81. 158 Fla. 750, 30 So.2d 298 (1947).
82. Id. at 752, 30 So.2d at 299.
83. 40 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1949).
84. Id. at 842. (Emphasis added.)
85. Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962).
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interest in the property was subject to levy. The court held that the hus-
band was vested with full property rights in the homestead. In Florida,
as in every other jurisdiction, the constitutional and statutory restrictions
upon the power to convey or devise the homestead do not prevent a tax
lien from attaching.8" It is interesting to note that the court relied on
Hinson v. Booth, the unrepudiated doctrine originally asserted in 1897,
when it observed that "it has long been settled that the Florida Constitu-
tion does not create property rights in the husband, wife or children."8
The federal court in applying state law, totally ignored Church v. Lee by
concluding that the children's interest was "remote, uncertain and a mere
expectancy or possibility and not a vested property right, interest or
title."88
The importance of the Weitzner decision lies in its logic, rather than
in its binding authority. As a rule of law, the rationale of the court was
sound, as ultimately borne out by the Florida Supreme Court later the
same year in Reed v. Fain,9 the most recent pronouncement on the
subject.
Reed v. Fain involved a husband who conveyed the homestead to
his son, joined in the deed by his wife, and had the son immediately re-
convey in an attempt to create an estate by the entireties. The convey-
ances were without consideration." After the father died, his daughter
initiated an action to obtain cancellation of the deeds as being violative
of her homestead rights under article X of the Florida Constitution. In
defense, the defendant-wife interposed the statute of limitations."' In-
itially, the court held that the deed was subject to the statute. 2 Justice
Thornal, speaking for the court, relied on its prior decision in Thompson
v. Thompson 3 in which the statute of limitations was held to bar an as-
sault against a deed of homestead property after twenty-five years. How-
ever, on rehearing, a new majority of the court expressly overruled
Thompson v. Thompson. 4 In Reed v. Fain, the court determined clearly
86. "It is well settled that state exemption laws do not protect property against
federal tax liens . . . nevertheless, there is a conflict in the cases as to whether a tax lien
is valid upon a homestead interest." 9 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 54.52, at
102 (1958).
87. Weitzner v. United States, supra note 85, at 47.
88. Id. at 48.
89. 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962).
90. The importance of an appropriate consideration is dealt with in the text accompany-
ing notes 102 through 132 infra.
91. FLA. STAT. § 95.23 (1963) which provides:
After the lapse of twenty years from the record of any deed or the probate of any
will purporting to convey lands no person shall assert any claim to said lands as
against the claimants under such deed or will, or their successors in title.
After the lapse of twenty years all such deeds or wills shall be deemed valid and
effectual for conveying the lands therein described, as against all persons who
have not asserted by competent record title an adverse claim.
92. Ibid.
93. 70 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1954).
94. Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858, 869 (Fla.. 1962).
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and explicitly that the voluntary alienation of the homestead in derogation
of the implied restraints imposed by the Constitution is a nullity and the
attempt is void. Upon reaching this conclusion, ii: pronounced -that the
statute of limitations is inapplicable to void deeds. Justice Hobson,
speaking for the new majority, stated:
The voluntary deed from George V. Reed executed and de-
livered to his parents in the year 1930 was an ineffectual and
futile attempt to create an estate by the entirety because the
voluntary deed made to him by his parents was and is void-not
merely voidable.5
The court emphasized its proposition that the deed was invalid and in-
effectual because of the limitations imposed on aliEnation by the Florida
Constitution. 6 In consequence, the statute of limitations no more could
apply to a void deed than it could to a forged deed.97
Justice Hobson went on to discuss the character of the children's
interests and specifically to recede from Church v. Lee:
Commissioner Andrews, in the case of Church v. Lee, inad-
vertently employed the descriptive adjective "vested" in re-
ferring to the inchoate interest of an "heir" in homestead prop-
erty. Clearly such an interest is not "vested," legally speaking,
until the death of the head of the family. Prior to that inevitable
event and during the lifetime of an "heir" such "interest,"
although actual as distinguished from imaginary, is not a
"vested interest." It is incipient, dependent and contingent, yet
genuine. It is created and protected by our Constitution. 8
The great difficulty with Reed v. Fain, as with its predecessor deci-
sions, is its refusal to recede from Hinson v. Booth, thereby continuing
the conflict with the broad principles propounded by the court in 1897
-to the effect that only the exemption inures to the heirs in accordance
with the constitution-not an estate or property interest. Presumably,
to the extent a court determines that Reed v. Fain is inapplicable to a
particular situation," Hinson v. Booth would still :ontrol.
Consideration-An Implied Requirement
The Constitution does not expressly require that conveyances of the
homestead be for an adequate or valuable consideration, although the
tenor of earlier decisions indicates that consideration is essential.00 Al-
95. Id. at 865. (Emphasis added.)
96. FLA. CONST. art. X, §§ 1, 2, 4.
97. Citing Wright v. Blocker, 144 Fla. 428, 198 So. 88 (1940).
98. Reed v. Fain, supra note 94 at 868. (Emphasis of the court.)
99. The Weitzner case, supra note 85, may be a good example, although it was decided
several months before Reed v. Fain.
100. Florida Nat'l Bank v. Winn, 158 Fla. 750, 30 So.2d 298 (1947); Jahn v. Purvis,
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though there have been several decisions regarding consideration as un-
essential to the conveyance of homestead property,' 01 in each case there
were other grounds to justify the decision or the court did in fact find
some consideration.
In the same year that Church v. Lee102 was decided, consideration
was implied as a requirement for the alienation of the homestead. In
Bess v. Anderson,10 3 the court announced that the alienation of homestead
contemplated by the constitution is not a conveyance without consider-
ation, even by an owner of the homestead directly to his wife.' Such a
conveyance cannot be effectual because it would violate the organic com-
mand that the homestead exemption "shall inure to the widow and heirs
of the property entitled to such exemption."' 05 The court explained that a
conveyance of homestead for proper consideration is constitutionally per-
missible since the consideration takes the place of the exempted prop-
erty. The principle of consideration propounded in Bess v. Anderson has
been adopted generally, although its application has caused considerable
difficulty'0 6 and the policy generated severe criticism.107
In 1939, eight years after Bess v. Anderson, the court was confronted
with a difficult application of the consideration principle. In Miller v.
Mobley, 0 18 fee simple title to the homestead was vested in the husband.
The wife joined in a conveyance to sell the property for an agreed price
of 35,000 dollars, of which 13,000 dollars was paid in cash and a purchase
money mortgage payable jointly to the husband and wife was executed
for the balance. The family then moved from the homestead. Three years
later, the purchasers became financially unable to meet the payments on
the purchase money mortgage. As a consequence, the property was re-
conveyed to Irvin Mobley and his wife, who, upon receipt of the deed,
returned to the homestead, making it their home until the husband's
death. An action seeking partition of the property was brought by the
children of the husband's first marriage. The defendant-wife asserted
145 Fla. 354, 199 So. 340 (1940); McEwen v. Larson, 136 Fla. 1, 185 So. 866 (1939);
Norman v. Kannon, 133 Fla. 710, 182 So. 903 (1938); Bess v. Anderson, 102 Fla. 1127,
136 So. 898 (1931); Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931); Jackson v. Jackson,
90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255 (1925) ; Norton v. Baya, 88 Fla. 1, 102 So. 361, (1924). See also
Estate of Nelson v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1956).
101. E.g., Denham v. Sexton, 48 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1950); Scoville v. Scoville, 40
So.2d 840 (Fla. 1949).
102. 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931).
103. 102 Fla. 1127, 136 So. 898 (1931).
104. Nor by the husband and wife joining in a conveyance without consideration to a
third person who reconveys the same property without consideration to the wife alone
or to the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties.
105. Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255 (1925); Norton v. Baya, 88 Fla. 1,
102 So. 361 (1924) ; Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920) ; Thomas v. Craft,
55 Fla. 842, 46 So. 594 (1908).
106. Miller v. Mobley, 136 Fla. 351, 186 So. 797 (1939).
107. Florida Nat'l Bank v. Winn, 158 Fla. 750, 30 So.2d 298 (1947).
108. Supra note 106.
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her ownership as the sole surviving tenant by the entireties under the
conveyance from the purchaser to her husband and herself. The court
held that the conveyance to the husband and wife, as tenants by the
entireties, was valid. The majority of the court emphasized that the hus-
band and wife were the owners of the mortgage and note as an estate by
the entireties. The wife had surrendered her interest in the mortgage and
note as consideration for the conveyance of the property. The court re-
garded this "surrender" to be a good and valuable consideration"'
Justices Chapman and Whitfield dissented sharply. At no time prior
to the sale of the property did -the wife assert ownership of the home-
stead, at which time she agreed to join in the deed and release her
inchoate right of dower provided the husband named her as payee of
the purchase money mortgage and note. When the deed reconveying the
homestead property was executed no money or other consideration moved
from the wife to the former purchasers. The mortgage was cancelled of
record and marked paid by the husband alone. The dissent went on to
point out: 110
[R]eleasing her possible dower is not a sufficient compliance
with Article 10 of the Constitution of Florida. It is not within
her power to defeat the provisions and requirements of Article
10, supra.
The Mobley decision reveals the inconsistency of the principle of
consideration implied by article X and advanced :in Bess v. Anderson.
There are no constitutional prohibitions, express or implied, to prevent a
husband's having property conveyed to him and his wife as tenants by
the entireties."' Furthermore, there are no prohibitions, express or im-
plied, to prevent alienation of the homestead by the husband, joined by
his wife, when that relation exists, for a full and valuable consider-
ation." '2 The problem arises, as in the Mobley case, when the husband
does alienate for a full and valuable consideration and accepts personalty
in return. May he effect a tenancy by -the entireties of such personal
property received from the homestead? Presumably he can."' If so, does
that imply that personalty derived from the sale of homestead property
is subject to the exemption attached to the homestead. real property? Only
in rare cases does personalty assume the status of the real property from
109. Presumably this case is to be differentiated from those situations where the
husband and wife convey without consideration to a third party as a conduit for the
purpose of having the property reconveyed to the wife or to the husband and wife as an
estate by the entireties. The general rule has no application, because there was a valid
and binding sale of the property and a conveyance by the husband and wife in the manner
provided by law for a good and sufficient consideration.
110. Miller v. Mobley, supra note 106, at 355, 186 So. at 799.
111. Norman v. Kannon, 133 Fla. 710, 182 So. 903 (1930).
112. Norton v. Baya, 88 Fla. 1, 102 So. 361 (1924).
113. Where the spouse simply sells the homestead, "the consideration takes the place
of the exempted property and the constitution may not thereby be violated." Norman v.
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which it is derived." 4 In order to apply consistently the implied consider-
ation requirement for the alienation of homestead property, it would
appear mandatory that the exemption attach to the personalty to prevent
the personal property from being used to reacquire the real estate and
effect by circuitous means that which cannot be effected directly under
the Constitution. Nevertheless, although the consideration received ad-
mittedly takes the place of the homestead," 5 the doctrine of Hinson v.
Booth disclaims any restraint on the alienation of personal property re-
ceived in exchange for homestead property."
6
There have been several instances in which the court has refused to
impose the consideration requirement upon homestead conveyances. In
Denham v. Sexton"' the court piously asserted that the only restriction
on alienation of homestead property was that it not be alienable without
the joint consent of husband and wife, regardless of whether it was deeded
with or without consideration. In Denham, the homestead was held as
an estate by the entireties. The husband and wife joined in gratuitous
conveyances of some of the "homestead" land. After the husband's death,
the widow conveyed all the property previously held by the entireties.
The grantee sought to cancel the gratuitous conveyances and relief was
denied. Ordinarily in cases concerned with such gratuitous conveyances,
the complaining parties are the children of the homesteader claiming
a protected interest under the Constitution. In Denham the plaintiff had
no such interest. Moreover, the children had no cause to complain since
the homestead had been originally owned by the entireties and would
vest in the surviving spouse in any event."'
In a somewhat earlier decision, a deed was executed by a husband to
his bride several hours before the wedding ceremony." 9 The court held
the deed valid by finding that the property was not homestead at the
time of conveyance, since the husband was not head of a household. 20
In any event, the court indicated that the real consideration for the
conveyance was the agreement of the bride to marry the grantor and
this was a sufficient consideration for the deed, even if it were assumed
there was no other, for marriage is deemed in law a consideration of
the highest value, as effective as if the grantee had paid full value in
money.
Kannon, supra note 111. See also Bess v. Anderson, 102 Fla. 1127, 136 So. 898 (1931).
114. Kohn v. Coates, 103 Fla. 264, 138 So. 760 (1931) (fire insurance proceeds).
115. Norman v. Kannon, supra note 111.
116. Hinson v. Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 22 So. 687 (1897).
117. 48 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1950).
118. See discussion on the right to bring the action in text accompanying notes 132
through 143 infra.
119. Scoville v. Scoville, 40 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1949).
120. Compare the holding of this case with Semple v. Semple, 82 Fla. 138, 89 So. 638
(1921), where the court held that the intent to create a homestead was controlling if the
parties conduct was completely consistent with such manifested intention.
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In the recent case of Reed v. Fain,2' the court noted that the words
"appropriate consideration" are not spelled out in article X of the Florida
Constitution. Therefore, they relied on Jackson v. Jackson"22 as authority
for the proposition that consideration constitutes an "implied" limitation
upon the alienation of homestead property.'28 Justice Hobson continued:
The only instances which we can envisage at the moment,
wherein one can attain the status of an innocent third party in
transactions involving homestead property owned by the head
of a family with a child or children then living, would be; First
-acceptance of a deed or mortgage predicated upon a valuable
consideration and executed by both husband and wife . .124
The extent and nature of the implied requirement of consideration
for conveyances of homestead property is illustrated by the posture of
the court in connection with the burden of proof. The general rule that
consideration shall be presumed in the conveyance of property does not
apply. In an old decision, Claflin v. Ambrose,"8 the court established
that the burden was on the wife to prove a consideration not materially
disproportionate to the value of the property conveyed. This rule was
reaffirmed in Church v. Lee126 when the court provided that where pay-
ment of a valuable consideration for conveyance of homestead to the wife
becomes a material question, it must be affirmatively proven by the party
relying upon the validity of the consideration.
Although there has been considerable judicial dissatisfaction with
the decisions implying that homestead can be conveyed only if supported
by valuable consideration,'1 27 it is unlikely that in the future the trend
will become more liberal. 128 Established precedent appears too strong to
validate a gratuitous conveyance of homestead property to the spouse. Of
course, the courts may become more adept at finding consideration. 29
From a policy viewpoint there is support fior either side of the
consideration argument. Whereas gratuitous conveyances might be
considered a fraud on the children's rights,8 0 conveyances for a valuable
121. 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962).
122. 90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255 (1925).
123. This "implied" limitation when judicially declared becomes and remains "a part
of the organic law."
124. Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858, 867 (Fla. 1962); the second instance envisioned by
the court was by tax deed.
125. 37 Fla. 78, 19 So. 628 (1896).
126. 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931).
127. The Constitution does not require consideration as a basis of alienation of
the homestead. This idea was doubtless injected into 5ome of the decisions
because of fraud or overreaching, otherwise it was mere surplusage and has no
application here. Florida Nat'l Bank v. Winn, 158 Fla. 750, 752, 30 So.2d 298,
300 (1947).
128. Porter v. Childers, 162 So.2d 301 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
129. BOXER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, 470, 471 (1964).
130. Rigero v. Daugherty, 69 So.2d 178 (Fla. 1953).
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consideration do not materially work to the detriment of the children's
interest, since the consideration received presumably takes the place of
the homestead.' On the other hand, the Constitution authorizes convey-
ances and encumbrances of the homestead without specifically requiring
consideration. It may be to the advantage of dependent minor children
for title to the homestead to be vested in the surviving parent. If the
children are independent adults, there would seem to be no necessity to
protect their inheritance rights in this manner. In any event, it should be
a matter dealt with by constitutional amendment or legislative enactment
rather than by judicial decree.
RIGHT OF ACTION
Any thorough examination of the implied restraints governing aliena-
tion of the homestead would be incomplete without also investigating the
principles governing the application of the doctrine. Who shall bring an
action disputing the validity of the ignominious deed: The children?
Husband? Wife? When does the cause of action accrue? At the death of
the head of the family, or upon execution and delivery of the deed?
The evolution of the limitation on alienation, culminating in the notable
case of Reed v. Fain,'82 presumably settles the issue, so that a voluntary
conveyance of the homestead, without an appropriate consideration, in an
attempt to create a tenancy by the entireties is a nullity,183 ineffective to
convey legal title' and void-not merely voidable.3 5 The controversy
continues, however, with regard to determining who has standing to
challenge the validity of the deed and when such action may be initiated.
Unfortunately, there have been few decisions bearing on this aspect of the
problem, and some of those are in conflict.8 6 In any event, it might
reasonably be anticipated that future litigation will center on these prob-
lems.
In General
The doctrine of the invalidity of the homestead deed is strictly, if
not puritanically, applied. A conveyance of homestead property, void at
the time of execution and delivery, is not cured by subsequent abandon-
131. Norman v. Kannon, 133 Fla. 710, 182 So. 903 (1930). In this regard, it is
significant to recognize that the full nature, extent and meaning of what constitutes
an "appropriate consideration" has yet to be clearly resolved. In dealing with the precious
homestead interest of children, so zealously protected by the judiciary, it will be intriguing
to see if the traditional concept of consideration will be found adequate when applied
to transactions between husband and wife. Cf. 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 136(c)
(1944).
132. 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962).
133. Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920).
134. Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931).
135. Reed v. Fain, supra note 132.
136. Compare New York Life Assur. Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164, 192 So. 637 (1939)
with Hutchinson v. Stone, 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920).
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ment of the premises,"' divorce of the parties,""8 or death of spouse.'8 9
Failure to resist a forced sale of the homestead will not constitute a
waiver of the homestead rights conferred by the Constitution. 40
Misconduct may act as a bar to the assertion of a homestead claim,
but the requisite degree of misconduct is unsettled. Clearly, a wife who
wilfully deserts her home would not be permitted to claim homestead upon
the death of the husband,' 41 nor would a wife or heir convicted of mur-
during the homesteader.'42 Current authority prevailing in other jurisdic-
tions involving non-homestead properties seems to indicate that less seri-
ous misconduct ordinarily would not bar a claim to homestead property.'48
There have been no decisions in Florida.
Heirs
The Constitution seeks to protect the heirs of the homesteader.'
Generally, the majority of cases controverting the validity of homestead
conveyances have been initiated by the heirs 4 ' or the invalidity of the
conveyances have been used by them as an absolute defense."'
In the event there are no children, the homestead descends to the
widow, 4 ' and the other heirs of the homesteader have no right to challenge
a conveyance duly made by the owner of the homestead to his wife. 48
However, when there are children, other heirs have standing. In an early
supreme court decision under the constitution of 1868 9° the court decided
that the exemption of the homestead accruing to the heirs accrues to an
adult son, adult grandson, and the son of a daughter deceased at the
death of the homesteader.
150
The who issue becomes obscure when the deed is executed to the
wife for life and remainder to the children. Certainly, pretermitted chil-
dren, grandchildren, and other lineal descendants are prejudiced by the
conveyance. However, it is unclear whether the protection intended by the
Constitution extends a right of action to them. In 1932 the court refused
137. Newman v. Jacobson, 108 Ark. 297, 158 S.W. 134 (1913).
138. Lynne v. Senter, 193 Ill. 382, 55 N.E. 838 (1899).
139. Mason v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 94 Ark. 107, 125 S.W. 656 (1910).
140. White v. Posick, 150 So.2d 263 (2d Dist. 1963); Albritton v. Scott, 73 Fla. 856,
74 So. 975 (1917).
141. Barlow v. Barlow, 156 Fla. 458, 23 So.2d 723 (1945).
142. FLA. STAT. § 731.31 (1963).
143. REDFFARN, WILLS & AD2'NISTRAnON OF ESTATES IN FLORIDA 565 (2d ed. 1946).
144. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 2.
145. Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962); Wilson v. Fla. Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 64 So.2d 309 (Fla. 1953); Norton v. Baya, 88 Fla. 1, 102 So. 361 (1924); Hinson v.
Booth, 39 Fla. 333, 22 So. 687 (1897).
146. Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931).
147. FLA. STAT. §§ 731.23-.27 (1963).
148. Rawlins v. Dade Lumber Co., 80 Fla. 398, 86 So. 334 (1920).
149. FLA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 3 (1868).
150. Miller v. Finegan, 26 Fla. 29, 7 So. 140 (1890).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
to invalidate a homestead conveyance creating a life estate with a vested
remainder to the children.' This decision may provide a predicate for
a holding that the consent of living children could make an otherwise
void deed valid, although such a result would be wholly inconsistent with
the Reed v. Fain5' doctrine and the relief it allegedly affords.
Another difficult problem involves when the right of action accrues.
The issue was posed in Reed v. Fain when the court was confronted with
the application of the statute of limitations to an illicit deed. Unfortu-
nately, the court avoided the issue. Justice Hobson stated:
The real question in this case is not: "When did the twenty year
period set forth in Section 95.23 F.S. begin to run?" But rather:
"Were the provisions of Section 95.23 F.S. intended to be appli-
cable to a 'void' deed . . .?1153
By way of dictum, Justice Hobson expressed apprehension at permitting
children to have an immediate right of action against their parents upon
execution and delivery of a void "homestead" deed.
[W] e have misgivings concerning the statement in the original
majority opinion to the effect that Mrs. Fain could have
"immediately" . . . "entered a court of equity to establish
[her] interest in the subject matter."'1 "
From a policy viewpoint, there is no necessity to permit children of
the homesteader a right of action immediately upon happening of the
"event." By its enlightening description, Reed v. Fain verified the
inchoate nature 55 of the children's interest in the homestead property:
[A]ctual as distinguished from imaginary, is not a "vested
interest." It is incipient, dependent and contingent, yet genuine.
It is created and protected by our Constitution.'5"
The interest created by the Constitution is protected by it.'57 It seems
unwise to create any right of action until the children's interest vests.
Husband
The competency of the children to contest the validity of a home-
stead conveyance is primarily a matter of the time the right of action
accrues. On the other hand, it is questionable whether a husband has a
151. Daniels v. Mercer, 105 Fla. 362, 141 So. 189 (1932).
152. 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962).
153. Id. at 864.
154. Id. at 868.
155. "Like inchoate dower . . . ownership is remote, uncertain and a mere expectancy
or possibility and not a vested property right, interest or title." Weitzner v. United States,
309 F.2d 45, 48 (5th Cir. 1962).
156. Reed v. Fain, supra note 152, at 868. (Emphasis of the court.)
157. Reed v. Fain, supra note 152.
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right of action at all. Historically, the general rule developed to the effect
that a deed which is void, even as to the husband himself, imposes an
estoppel, both at law and in equity, effectively barring the husband from
setting up any right or claim adverse to the deed, either in his own behalf
or as trustee or representative of his wife and chilldren.' 18 Nevertheless,
it has been recognized that estoppel does not apply to a husband who has
given a deed which the law makes absolutely void.'59
In Florida the issue has never been resolved. Ina Hutchinson v. Stone
the deed was described as "a nullity as to the 'heirs' of the homestead
owner and also as to the husband and wife."' However, Miller v. West
Palm Beach Atlantic Nat'l Bank'' ascribed -to the rule that the husband
was estopped to deny the title. In Church v. Lee the court straddled the
issue:
While there might be instances where equity would decree as
valid a deed to the homestead executed by the owner and wife
to the latter, it is not essential in deciding the is;ues raised by the
demurrer .... 162
In Semple v. Semple,163 the court was directly confronted with cir-
cumstances that might give rise to an estoppel, yet it failed to recognize
its possible existence. The validity of his own prior deed was challenged
by a husband in a divorce proceeding. The husband, in a counterclaim,
moved to set aside the deed which seemed to convey the homestead, on the
basis that it was void under the Florida Constitution. Significantly, the
court ignored any possibility of applying an estoppel against the husband's
right to assert the invalidity of the deed. Instead, in a, far reaching opinion,
it found that the homestead character had not attached to the property at
the time of the conveyance,"" and that therefore the deed was valid.
Justice Whitfield dissented, contending that homestead had certainly
attached -to the property by the time of the conveyance, and for that
158. WAPLES, HOMESTEAD AND EX EPTioN (1892); not only is the husband himself
estopped by his own deed but he cannot set up against his grantee or mortgagee a right of
homestead as existing in his minor children, because such right is personal to them, and
even if pleaded by them during his lifetime would be no Jar to a writ of entry.
Foss v. Strachn, 42 N.H. 40 (1860).
159. Housatonic Bank v. Martin, 43 Mass. (1 Met.) 294 (1840); Chandler v. Ford,
30 Eng. C.L. (3 Adm. & Eccl. 649) 301 (1853).
160. 79 Fla. 157, 164, 84 So. 151, 154 (1920). (Emphasis added.)
161. 142 Fla. 22, 194 So. 230 (1940).
162. Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 488, 136 So. 243, 247 (1931).
163. 82 Fla. 138, 89 So. 638 (1921).
164. Ibid.; the case set the rule that actual residence is not a requisite of homestead
attaching. It stands for the proposition that:
Where it is clearly the manifest intention of the owner to occupy the premises
immediately as a home, and this intention is evidenced by specific acts . .. not
compatible with a different intention, . . . or . . . inconsistent with the asserted
intention to make the place his homestead, the homestead character will attach.
Id. at 139, 89 So. at 639.
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reason the deed was a nullity that should be set aside. Justice Whitfield
never mentioned a potential estoppel, either.
The Semple case is significant in its silence rather than in its expres-
sion. The court easily could have reached the same result by applying the
doctrine of estoppel. Generally, a void deed does not work an estoppel,' 65
nor does estoppel render valid an act prohibited by express provisions of
the law. 6' Perhaps, the Semple case presumes the general rule without
expressing it. On the other hand, the court may have merely overlooked
the issue.
Policy considerations suggest that there is some merit in permitting
a husband to contest the validity of his own deed in order to clear title
to the homestead, although by estopping him there would be no detriment
suffered by the "established" interests 67 of the children. The value
becomes apparent in a divorce action where record title reflects a tenancy
by the entireties. In the event of divorce, the title is converted to a tenancy
in common,' 68 vesting equal undivided alienable interests in the husband
and wife. To deny the husband's standing to determine the validity of his
deed would mislead subsequent good-faith purchasers relying on record
title. Logically, it follows that a divorcing husband should not be estopped
to deny the validity of his void deed. Allowing the non-divorcing husband
to clear title to the homestead property seems equally desirable. Certainly,
it would not prejudice the children's established homestead rights, while
it may obviate later litigation.
Wife
The supreme court is in conflict with regard to the competence of
a wife to assert an exempt interest in homestead property in contradiction
to her acts. Undoubtedly, the same principles of estoppel applicable to a
husband-head of a family would also pertain to the wife. However,
estoppel has been imposed where the wife attempted to interpose the
invalidity of a deed in derogation of her representations to a bona fide
party.
A bitterly fought 1936 case illustrates the application of an estoppel
against a wife. In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates,'69 the wife !had
signed a mortgage on the homestead and willingly delivered it to her
husband giving him the opportunity to have her signature acknowledged
outside her :presence, and to use it to induce good faith mortgagees to
rely and give value therefore. The court, applying the doctrine of estoppel
to bar the wife from asserting the invalidity of the mortgage, stated:
165. Phillips v. Lowestein, 91 Fla. 89, 107 So. 350 (1926).
166. Whitlock v. Gosson, 35 Neb. 829, 53 N.W. 980 (1892); 12 FLA. JUR. Estoppel and
Waiver § 10 (1957).
167. Reed v. Fain, 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962).
168. FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1963).
169. 141 Fla. 164, 192 So. 637 (1939).
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[B]ut neither the constitution nor the statutes provide ... and
the organic and statutory provisions do not intend or contem-
plate that the required regulations may be so utilized as to
mislead those who in good faith acquire such conveyances or
mortgages. Nor do the constitution and statutes forbid the appli-
cation of the principles of estoppel, laches, waiver, acquiesence
or other principles of law in proper cases where conveyances or
mortgages are alleged to have been defectively executed or ac-
knowledged by married women or others when adverse interests
are involved. 70
This decision is in conflict with Hutchinson v. Stone, 7' where a wife
also contended that she had not acknowledged her signature on the mort-
gage. The court, in that instance, ruled that the mortgage was void as
not being "duly executed" and refused to inflict an estoppel against her.
Significantly, the Oates decision, although 16 years later, did not over-
rule the Hutchinson case. If any inference is possible from Reed v.
Fain,'72 it is that further inroads by Oates are unlikely.
Creditors
Although there have been relatively few decisions, creditors of the
husband, wife and heirs have not fared well in homestead litigation. In
view of the nature of the property-exempt under the constitution from
forced sale' 73 -the courts appear reluctant to extend a right of action to
creditors of the family. Presumably, a creditor could be given recognition
for his "expectant interest." Every creditor patiently awaits the time the
property might lose its homestead character and have his judgment attach
by operation of law.174 The better rule, however, would permit a creditor
a right of action only in the event the property actually loses its homestead
character, for it is not until that time that the invalid alienation infringes
on his rights.
In an early decision, 175 a judgment creditor levied against property
that a husband had conveyed to his wife while the property constituted
homestead. The creditor contended that the deed to the wife was void as
being a fraud on his children's homestead rights. As such, the husband,
being a party to the fraud, should be estopped from asserting homestead
as a defense. The court logically decided that the attempted transfer of
legal title by the husband to the wife could not give the judgment creditor
a greater lien upon the property than he had before such attempted
transfer. The right to the exemption of the homestead would not be for-
170. Id. at 176, 192 So. at 642.
171. 79 Fla. 157, 84 So. 151 (1920).
172. 145 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1962).
173. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
174. FLA. STAT. § 55.10 (1963).
175. Murphy v. Farquhar, 39 Fla. 350, 22 So. 681 (1897).
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feited in any event, and therefore, the creditor had no standing to chal-
lenge the deed. Generally, conveyances made to defeat creditors can be
attacked, but not when the property is homestead.""
CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court is unique in the interpretation of its
homestead provisions by creating an inchoate interest in the homesteader's
children.7 7 The interest is constitutionally protected and virtually inde-
structible. Although merely inchoate, it may be divested only by disposi-
tion of the homestead for value or by abandonment. The effect of the
court's construction of the Constitution has created a significant restraint
on the alienation of homestead property by inter vivos deed. It is un-
fortunate the court has seen fit to "legislate" in this sensitive area of
family life. Assuredly, the legislature could supercede judicial precedent
by the adoption of a constitutional amendment. The failure of the legis-
lature to act often has given rise to a presumption of its approval. It is
feared, in this instance at least, that the failure is due to a lack of compre-
hension of the issues rather than to its approval of the result.
The restraint on alienation imposed by the judiciary is as absurd as
it is inconsistent. By stubbornly protecting an irrational proprietary
interest impliedly intended by the founding fathers of our Constitution,
the court has cast serious doubts which undermine the foundation of the
very institution it seeks to preserve-the homestead. Incredibly, the
court finds no inconsistency in its proposition that a husband may not
gratuitously bestow a half interest in the homestead upon his wife 78 but
may, with the blessing of the judiciary, sell the homestead and give her
the entire proceeds.
1 79
176. Cowdery v. Herring, 106 Fla. 567, 143 So. 433 (1932); Anderson Mill & Lumber
Co. v. Clements, 101 Fla. 523, 134 So. 588 (1931).
177. No other jurisdiction has similarly interpreted their homestead laws.
178. Reed v. Fain, supra note 172.
179. See Miller v. Mobley, 136 Fla. 351, 186 So. 797 (1939).
